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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Ross Telford
d/b/a Telford Construction Co.
Plaintiff - Respondent
vs.
Newell J. Olsen

&

CASE NO. 12119

Sons

Construction Company,
a corporation
Defendant - Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This mater arises out of judgement of The First Judicial
District Court, granting Plaintiff judgment on his complaint and
denying Defendant judgment on its counterclaim. The judgment
on Plaintiff's complaint is based on a number of claims.

First,

Plaintiff claims under a construction subcontract for money offset
by the Defendant from the contract price.

Second, Plaintiff

claims money due for extra work performed under change orders
under the same construction subcontract.

Third, Plaintiff claims

damages resulting from interferance with Plaintiff's performance
under said construction subcontract, by the Defendant.

Fourth,

Plaintiff claims money due for equipment rental in performing
work not covered by the construction subcontract. Fifth, Plaintiff
claims money due under an oral bonus contract.
Defendant's counterclaim is based on Defendant's claim for
Illoney due under an Addendum Agreement for money loaned and
not repaid pursuant to said agreement.
1

Agreement of Subcontract. The transactions which are relevant to
Defendant's appeal follow below.
FIRST:. During the course of performance of said Agreement
of Subcontract, the Defendant employed another subcontractor to
perform certain clean up work to Plaintiff's subcontract, after
Plaintiff failed to perform said work in accordance with specifica·
tions. (T.356, 357)

Defendant offset the amount paid for said

clean up work from the contract price. Plaintiff claims this offset
to be an unjustified offset because Defendant had told Plaintiff
that it would have the clean up work performed at no cost to
Plaintiff. (R. 94)

Also during the course of performance of the

Subcontract certain of Plaintiff's suppliers made demands on the
Defendant for payment of Plaintiff's accounts. (T. 31, 32, 296,
297, 298, 299, 300)

Defendant paid said accounts and offset the

same from the contract price. Plaintiff also claims these payments
to be an unjustified offset.
SECOND:

Approximately two months after Plaintiff com·

menced performance of the Subcontract the Defendant, having
reason to think that Plaintiff would not complete his performance,
(T. 137, 138) went to Plaintiff and offered him a two thousand
dollar ($2,000.00) bonus if he would satisfactorily complete his
performance under the Subcontract. (T. 359) This offer of bonus.
and the terms thereof were set out in a letter from Defendant to
Plaintiff dated November 15, 1968. (Pl. Ex. 7)
THIRD:

During the course of performance of said Suh·

contract, certain change orders were instituted, which resulted in
additional earth work to be performed by Plaintiff in the amount
of nine thousand six hundred twenty four yards (9,624) greater
than the contract estimate.

(Pl. Ex. 27·(2) )

The Subcontract

estimated the earth work at fifty thousand nine hundred thirteen
3

DISPOSITION IN

LOWER COURT

This case was tried to a jury in The First Judicial District
Court of Cache County, the jury returned a general verdict in favor
of the Plaintiff in the

amount

of

Fifty-five hundred

($5500.00) on Plaintiff's complaint. (R. 155)

dollars

The jury also

returned a general verdict on the Defendant's counterclaim in favor
of the Plaintiff and denying Defendant recovery on its counter·
claim. (R. 154)

The Court entered judgment on the verdicts in

favor of the Plaintiff on his complaint in the amount of Fifty-five
hundred dollars ($5500.00) and denying Defendant recovery on
its counterclaim, plus costs of Court in the amount of Seventy-eight
dollars and sixty cents ($78.60), on the 6th day of March, 1970.
(R. 156)

The Court further entered

an

order

denying the

Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on the 8th day of May, 1970.

(R. 165)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's judgment
entered on the jury verdict March 6, 1970, and reversal of the trial
court's order denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, for the
reason that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdicts of
the jury and said verdicts were contrary to the law.
STATEMENT

OF THE

FACTS

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Agreement of
Subcontract on the 17th day of August, 1966, wherein the De·
fendant was the general contractor for an irrigation project sponsored by the Montpelier Irrigation Company of Bear Lake County,
Idaho, and the Plaintiff as subcontractor was to perform certain
work on said irrigation project. (Pl. Ex. 24) The Plaintiff's claims
and Defendant's counterclaim arose out of transactions between
Plaintiff and Defendant in the course of performance of said
2

prior thereto, pay all such claims for labor and materials and charge
the amount to subcontratcor."
"In paragraph 6 of the Addendum Agreement the Plaintiff
subcontractor agreed as follows:-

"In the event the subcontractor

fails or refuses to complete said project and agreement, contractor
may hire any unfinished work; and materials furnished and completed and the cost thereby incurred, together with any sums owing
on the advance made pursuant to this agreement, shall be paid by
subcontractor to contractor on demand; and the amount expended
by contractor to complete the project and the agreement shall bear
interest from the date of said demand at the rate of seven per cent
(7%) per annum".
The only instruction given by The Court which deals with
offsets, directs the jury to determine the amount of monies not paid
because of unjustified offsets. (see Instruction No. 20, R. 143) At
no place is the jury instructed what is a justified offset.

In this

case the agreement of the parties controls when an offset against
the contract price is justified.

Paragraph

12

of

the contract

specifically permits an offset in the event of the failure of the
subcontractor to pay for all materials and labor used in the prosecution of said work where the contractor has made said payment. A
finding by the jury that the Doyle Anthony offset would not be
allowed under paragraph 12 of the contract, would be clearly
contrary to the evidence presented in this case. (See testimony of
Doyle Anthony transcript p. 296-300)

Paragraph 6 of the Adden-

dum Agreement as set out in the proposed instruction No. 3 makes
it clear that the Defendant could hire any unfinished work done
and offset the costs to complete said work from the contract price.
The reasonableness of the claimed offsets for unpaid bills has been
upheld under general principles of law governing the availability
5

yards (50,913) and Plaintiff bid this at twenty cents (20c) per
yard. (Pl. Ex. 24)

The Plaintiff here contends that he should be

compensated on the basis of a reasonable price per yard, which
he contends is thirty-five cents (35c), (Pl. Ex. 27-(2) ), for the
additional earth work, rather than be compensated at the contract
price of twenty cents (20c) per yard.
FOURTH:

During the construction of the irrigation

Defendant placed a number of structures and head gates in position
in the canal bank before Plaintiff completed his earth work under
the Subcontract. (T. 108, 109, 321-329)

Plaintiff claims that said

action on the part of the Defendant interfered with his machinery
doing the earth work and claims damages therefore. (Pl. Ex. 27)
Plaintiff testified that there was no prior agreement which controls,
whether or not the structures could be placed in position before
the earth work. (T. 108)

1

An expert witness testified for the

Defendant that the custom and practice in canal construction in '
reference to installing head gates and other structures, before the
earth work is completed, is that it is done both before and after.
(T. 183, 184)

The Defendant contends that the element of time

of completing the project required that the structures be placed in
position ahead of the earth work. (T. 321-329)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.
The Defendant's proposed instruction No. 3 is as follows:
"In paragraph 12 of the contract the Plaintiff subcontractor agreed

as follows:

In the event of the failure of the subcontractor during

the progress of the work or any time thereafter, to pay for all
materials and labor used in the prosecution of said work, the con·
tractor may at his option, and without notice to the subcontractor
4

tion for the modification requiring Defendant to perform this work
under the contract without charging the Plaintiff.

In this case

the lack of consideration to support this modification clearly required the court to direct the jury to the effect that this modification agreement was not enforceable under the law.
POINT III
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S AGREEMENT TO BONUS THE
PLAINTIFF IF HE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED HIS
PERFORMANCE UNDER THE SUBCONTRACT WAS
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
As pointed out in the statement of facts, the Bonus Contract
consisted of an agreement by the Defendant to pay Plaintiff a Two
Thousand dollar bonus ($2,000.00) if he would satisfactorily
complete his performance under the Subcontract. Essentially the
Bonus Contract consisted of a promise to pay additional money
to the Plaintiff if he would complete his required performance
under the contract.

This means that the Plaintiff was required

to do no more than was originally required under the contract.
The rule as to whether there is consideration for a promise of
additional payment to complete the required performance under
the contract is set out in the following statement from 13 Am.

Jur. 2d 9, Building and Construction Contracts, Sec. 5: "According
to the rule supported in most jurisdictions which have passed on
the matter a promise by a contractor under a building and construction contract, to pay the Contractor compensation additional
to that provided for in the contract for the performance of the
contract is at least in th absence of any unforseen difficulties in
performance, unenforceable because without consideration".
See in support of the above statement of the rule 12 ALR 2d
78 Consideration for Additional Payment; Straw v. Temple _(1916)
7

of offsets.

Also, the availability of offsets, for completion of the

subcontractor's work after the subcontractor has failed to complete
his work has been upheld under general principles of law govern.
ing availability of offsets.

See 46 ALR 397; 13 Am. Jur. 2d 109,

Building and Construction Contracts Sec. 119
From the above it is clear that the types of offsets which the
Defendant was trying to make were justified as a matter of law,
and by not instructing the jury on the legal matter of what offsets
are justified the Court left this legal question to be determined

!

by the jury.
POINT II
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE
CLEAN-UP WORK DONE BY ANOTHER SUBCON·
TRACTOR AT NO COST TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS UN·
ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERA·
TION.
Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the contractor
agreed to have part of the subcontractor's performance performed
by a third party without deducting the cost to have this work done
from the total contract price.

This modification of the contract

terms which allows Plaintiff to do less work under the contract
than required by the original contract agreement must be supported
by consideration the same as any other modification of the contract's
terms.

The parties to this contract could modify or waive their

rights under the contract the same as under any other contract.
However, as in the case of other contracts the modification or
waiver must be supported by consideration.

The rule of law re·

quiring consideration for a contract modification is so well established there can be no dispute about that requirement.
Jur. 2d 936

Sec. 469.

1 7 Am.

No evidence was introduced in

this case which in any way would indicate that there was considera:

6

1

be completed to the satisfaction of the Project Engineer Mr.
Whiting.

It is also clear and uncontradicted from the testimony

of Newell J. Olsen that when the Plaintiff left the job the cleanup work left to be done and the Agreement of Subcontract remained uncompleted. (T. 355, 356)

The testimony of Mr. Olsen

is equally clear that Defendant employed and paid another subcontractor to perform this clean-up work. (T. 357) The testimony
of Mr. Philip Whiting, Project Engineer, which was presented in
this case by way of deposition, makes it clear that the Project Engineer did not consider the job complete until the clean-up work
was performed. (T. 281, 282)

From this it is clear that the evi-

dence does not support a finding by the jury that the terms of the
contract requiring the Project Engineer's approval of completion
of the project was performed.
POINT V
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT
THE ADDITIONAL EARTHWORK SHOULD HAVE
BEEN COMPENSATED FOR AT THE CONTRACT PRICE
OF TWENTY CENTS PER YARD (20c)
The question of whether the additional earth work performed
by the Plaintiff should have been compensated for at the contract

per unit price of twenty cents per yard (20c) or at a reasonable
price per yard is controlled by the agreement of the parties. The
agreement of the parties is determined first from the express
writing of the contract and to assist in interpretation of the meaning of the written contract the custom of the trade is to be considered.

Paragraph 5 of the subcontract specifically deals with

changes required to be made and appears to deal with the price
to be charged for such changes.

Said paragraph is as follows:

"5. The Subcontractor hereby agrees to make any and all
changes furnish the materials and perform the work that the
Contractor may require without nullifying this agreement,
at a reasonable addition to or reduction from, the contract

9

48 Utah 258, 159 P. 44 Smith v. Brown (1917) 50 Utah 27, 165
P. 468.
The question of whether the Plaintiff's agreement to perform
under the change orders is additional consideration is controlled
by paragraph 5 of the subcontract which requires the subcontractor
to perform such additions and changes it states as follows: 'The
Subcontractor hereby agrees to make any and all changes, furnish
materials and perform the work that the Contractor may
without nullifying this Agreement at a reasonable addition to or
reduction from the contract price hereinbefore named, and prorate
to the same". (Emphasis Added)
It is clear from the above that the Court should have ruled as
a matter of law that the Bonus Agreement was not supported by
consideration.
POINT

IV

A FINDING BY THE JURY OF PERFORMANCE OF THE
TERMS OF THE BONUS AGREEMENT BY THE PLAIN·
TIFF IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant's Agreement to bonus the Plaintiff if he would
complete his performance, and the terms thereof, are contained in
a letter of November 15, 1966 from Defendant to the Plaintiff.
That letter was introduced into evidence as Pl. Ex. 7. The pertinent
parts of said letter are as follows:
"I have discussed this matter with my firm and we have come
up with the following proposals:
"1. We believe you should continue on the Canal without

delay and that you should complete it at the earliest possible
time. When this is complete and the floodway is complete as
far as you have gone with it, we will bonus you two thousand
dollars ( $2 ,000.00) we will require a letter stating it is com·
plete signed by Mr. Whiting".

It appears that an important part of the Bonus Agreement
was that the Plaintiff's performance under the subcontract was to
8

Defendant's conduct in placing the structures ahead of the earthwork was negligent. The court clearly did not give any instructions
to the jury on negligence. If the Defendant is to recover on the
claimed interference, it must be on the basis of a breach of contract
by the Defendant.

It is clear from the Plaintiff's own testimony

that there was no prior understanding between the parties whether
the structures would go in before or after the earthwork. On page
108 of the transcript, the Plaintiff testified as follows:

"Q. Mr. Telford, when you bid this job did you learn enywhere either through information provided you orally
through Mr. Olsen, or from the plans and specifications as
to when the structures were to be placed in the canal bank?
"A. No.

"Q. Did you ever find out whether there was anything in
the plans and specifications requiring such installation either
before or after the earthwork?
"A.

There wasn't".
Since there was no prior agreement between the parties,

it would appear that the reasonableness of the action of the Defendant, placing structures ahead of the earthwork should be controlling.

The reasonableness of such action should be controlled

by first, the custom of the trade, and second, by the Defendant's
reasons for placing the structures ahead of the earthwork. There
seems to be little or no doubt as to what the custom of the trade
requires.

One expert witness who has had considerable experience

in all phases of canal construction testified at page 183 and 184
of the transcript as follows:

"Q. In your canal work have you ever formulated an opinion
as to what the custom and practice is in the canal construction work in reference to installing head gates and other
structures in head of the contractor doing the earthwork.
In other words, could you tell us what is the general practice
in going ahead of the earthwork in constructing . , .
"A. Well, it's done both ways.
11

price hereinbefore named and prorate to the same. (Emphasis
Added)"
From this section of the contract it appears that the words
"and prorate to the same" means that the contract requires that
additions to the contract required by change orders under paragraph
5 of the contract are required to be performed at the contract
price.

A second factor about the written contract which would in·
dicate that the additional earthwork was to be compensated for
at the bid price is that in paragraph 2 of the contract which sets
out the items covered by the Subcontract a unit price is set out
for the earthwork.

This appears to be a unit bid.

The use of

unit bids in contracting earthwork was explained by an expert
witness for the Defendant. (T. 187, 188)

The expert witness

stated that the quantity figure was an engineering estimate only
and that the normal practice under government contracts is that ',
unless the quantity runs substantially greater than the engineering
estimate, additional compensation is not allowed.
From the above it is clear that a finding that the additional
earthwork should have been compensated at the contract price is
the only finding consistent with the evidence and the court should
have so instructed the jury as a matter of law.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING BY
THE JURY THAT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
REQUIRED THE STRUCTURES TO BE PLACED IN POSI·
TION AFTER THE EARTH WORK WAS COMPLETED.
The recovery of damages by Plaintiff for the delay of Plaintiff's equipment, resulting from Defendant placing the structures
in position in the canal bank before Plaintiff had a chance to
complete his earthwork is controlled by the Agreement of the
Parties.

There appears to be no contention in this case that the
10

or collusion on the part of the subcontractor, then the time
herein fixed for the completion of the work shall be extended
the number of days that said subcontractor has thus been delayed, but no allowance or extension shall be made unless a
claim therefore is presented in writing to the contractor within
forty-eight hours of the commencement of such delay."
The notice provisions of the above clause is a condition subsequent to bringing an action based on such delay. The reason for
this notice provision is to allow the contractor to remedy the cause
of the delay.

There was no evidence presented in this case that

the required written notice was given.
POINT VIII
THE CONTRACT DENIES RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
FOR DELAY.
Paragraph 4 of Section 3 of the contract provides as follows:
"In the absence of breach of contract by the contractor or
owner no claims for additional compensation or damages for
delay will be allowed by the contractor and said extension of
time for the completion shall be the sole remedy of the subcontractor, provided however, that in the event and in such
event only, the contractor obtains additional compensation
from the owner on account of such delays and then and in
that event, subcontractor shall be entitled to such portion of
such additional compensation so received by the contractor
from the owner as is equitable under all the circumstances.
(Emphasis Added)"
From the above provision it is very clear that the contract
remedy of additional time is the exclusive remedy granted for
delay and that an action cannot be brought for damages resulting
from said delay.

As pointed out under point 6 above, this De-

fendant was not in breach of contract, because placing the structures
ahead of the earthwork was reasonable.
POINT IX
THE GENERAL VERDICT OF THE JURY REQUIRES
REVSERSAL AND REMANDING OF THE CASE FOR A
NEW TRIAL IF ANYONE OF THE ABOVE POINTS
ARE GROUNDS FOR A REVERSAL.
In rendering a general verdict it is not possible to determine
13

"Q. Have you seen it done both ways in your experience.
"A. Yes, we've done it both ways."
Mr. Philip Whiting, the Project Engineer testified in the
transcript at page 272, as follows:
"Q. From your experience as an engineer is this an unusual
procedure to place the structure ahead of the bank.
Mr. Daines: I am not dear what you mean.
"Q. Well ahead of the contractor that's building the bank,
place the structures in before the bank is built.
"A. It's been done both ways. I would say probably more
from what I have observed or been around most of the time,
the canal banks are built first, but it has been done both
ways."
From the above it is clear that the practice in the trade is to
put the structures in both before and after the earthwork. The '
Defendant claims that the factor of time of completion of the project required the Defendant to place the structures ahead of the
earthwork. (T. 326)

It would appear that this reason would

sustain the reasonableness of the placing of the structures in position ahead of the earthwork.

From the above it is clear that the

evidence will not support a finding that the actions of the Defendant placing the structures ahead of the earthwork was unreasonable.

POINT VII

THE JURY SHOULD HA VE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT
THE CONTRACT REQUIRED THE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE
THE DEFENDANT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS WRITTEN
NOTICE OF THE INTERFERENCE.
Paragraph 2 of Section 3 of the contract states as follows:
"Should the subcontractor be delayed in the prosecution or
completion of the work by the act, neglect or default of the
owner, of the engineer, or of the contractor, or should the
subcontractor be delayed for waiting for materials, if required
by this contract to be furnished by the owner or contractor,
or by damage caused by fire or other casualty for which the
subcontractor is not responsible, or by combined action of
the workmen, in no wise caused by or resulting from default
12

which causes of action are the basis for the verdict of fifty.five
hundred dollars ($5,500.00)

1

Thus if the recovery could not be !

had on anyone of the causes of action, it will be necessary to determine which causes of action relief has been granted on. See
O'Brien v. Wallace 359 P. 2d 1029, 145 Colo. 291.
SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted to the court that the verdict of the
jury was contrary to the facts and the law and that this court should
enter an order reversing the trial's court's judgment and remanding
the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted by
Dale M. Dorius
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant - Appellant
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